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DISCLOSURE OF ADVERSE EVENTS:  
AN INTEGRAL AND NECESSARY PART OF THE 
TREATMENT? 
 
BILL MADDEN∗ & TINA COCKBURN∗∗ 
 
‘Informing a patient of what treatment has been given and what has taken 
place while doing so, whether or not there has been a catastrophe, is 
integrally and necessarily part of giving medical treatment to a person’.1 
 
                                                 
∗ Part-time Lecturer, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia. 
∗∗ Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Australia.  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Emmelene Gray, law student, 
Queensland University of Technology. 
1 Breen v Williams 1994, New South Wales Supreme Court, unreported, Bryson J, 10 October 1994. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
 
An ordinary patient receiving negligent medical treatment may have little, if any, 
perception of an adverse event or negligence having affected his or her medical 
outcome. This is, perhaps, more evident where the patient was at the time affected by 
anaesthesia or sedation, or was a child or under a disability. Such a patient is in a 
different position to a person injured in a car accident, or at work, or in a public place. 
In the ordinary course of events, that person would at least be aware of the 
relationship between an incident and an injury, and so if not already cognisant of a 
negligent cause of injury, then at least would be aware of that possibility as 
warranting investigation. 
 
An ‘adverse event’ is defined as ‘an incident in which unintended harm resulted to a 
person receiving health care’.2 Practical guidelines for the disclosure of adverse 
events to patients have been in place in Australia for some time. However, there has 
been no widely recognised ethical obligation or legal duty to disclose to a patient the 
medical practitioner’s knowledge or suspicion of an adverse event caused by that 
practitioner (or indeed another practitioner), even in cases where the practitioner 
recognises that the event could be negligent.  
 
II PRACTICAL GUIDELINES  
 
The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) was 
established in January 2000 by the Australian Health Ministers to lead national efforts 
to improve the safety and quality of health care provision in Australia. In 2003 the 
ACSQHC obtained endorsement from the Australian Health Ministers of a National 
Open Disclosure Standard.  
                                                 
2 Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, Open Disclosure Standard (2003) 6 citing 
Ross Wilson, WilliamRunciman, and Robert Gibberd, ‘Quality in Health Care Study’ (1995) 16(9) 
Medical Journal of Australia 458  
<http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/F87404B9B00D8E6CC
A2571C60000F049/$File/OpenDisclosure_web.pdf> at 8 March 2007. 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALTA 
2006 Refereed Conference Papers 
 
  5
This document has no legal standing,3 rather, it was put forward as a resource for 
those organisations seeking to implement open disclosure. Open disclosure is defined 
to refer to open communication when things go wrong in health care, the elements 
including an expression of regret, a factual explanation of what happened, 
consequences of the event; and steps being taken to manage the event and to prevent a 
recurrence.4 
 
In relation to the practical implementation of the disclosure guidelines, it has been 
noted:   
 
…as long as stakeholders recognise and accept that the open disclosure process 
should not and is not intended to constitute a detailed forensic analysis of the event 
but is rather confined to the prompt and emphatic notification of the fact that things 
went wrong, coupled with an undertaking (where that can be given) to conduct and 
report back on relevant follow-up, many of the difficulties will be avoided.5  
 
In July 2005 the Australian Health Ministers acknowledged the widespread 
acceptance of the ACSQHC’s National Safety and Quality agenda and agreed to 
establish the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care to facilitate 
the development and implementation of ACSQHC’s initiatives, including the National 
Open Disclosure Standard. The Commission succeeded the ACSQHC as from 2006. 
Running in parallel in New South Wales is the work of the Clinical Excellence 
Commission. 
                                                 
3 As to the legal status of Australian Standards, Standards Australia states: ‘Standards are not legal 
documents. But because of their convenience and the willingness of all parties to adopt them, many 
of them are actually called up in Federal or State legislation, and then become mandatory; however 
most are used voluntarily by people who value their expertise and common sense. They’re practical 
and don’t set impossible goals. They’re based on sound industrial and scientific experience. And, 
because they’re regularly revised, they also keep pace with new technologies.’ See Chicco v 
Corporation of the City of Woodville (1990) Australian Torts Reports 81-028; Giner v Public Trustee 
(1991) 105 FLR 410; Maynard v Rover Mowers Ltd (2000) QCA 26. See generally Corrs Chambers 
Westgarth, Open Disclosure Project: Legal Review (2002) pt 9: Making compliance mandatory: the 
role and status of standards’, 57–9 
<www.nsh.nsw.gov.au/teachresearch/cpiu/CPIUwebdocs/FinalLR858178v1.pdf> at 27 March 2007.  
4 See Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, National Open Disclosure Standard: 
Fact sheet 
 <http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/3D5F114646CEF93DC
A2571D5000BFEB7/$File/opendisclfact.pdf > at 27 March 2007. 
5 Corrs Chambers Westgarth, above n 3, pt 2.1.3: The Health Professionals, 7. 
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III ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
The New South Wales Medical Board (NSWMB) obtained approval from the then 
Health Minister, Mr Morris Iemma, for a Code of Professional Conduct entitled 
‘Good Medical Practice: The Duties of a Doctor Registered in New South Wales’6 
under s 99A of the Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW). Standard 2.5 contemplates 
disclosure of adverse events to patients in cases of serious harm. The standard is in the 
following terms: 
 
2.5 … act immediately to put matters right, if it is possible, if a patient under your care 
has suffered serious harm, through misadventure or for any other reason. You should 
explain fully to the patient what has happened and the likely short and long-term 
effects. When appropriate, you should offer an apology. If the patient lacks the maturity 
to understand what has happened, you should explain the situation honestly to those 
with parental responsibility for the child. If the patient is cognitively impaired you 
should provide explanation to the patient's parent, guardian, carer or person responsible.  
 
The New South Wales provisions are modelled on the Good Medical Practice 
guidelines developed in 1988 by the United Kingdom General Medical Council 
(GMC)7 which state:8 
 
22. If a patient under your care has suffered harm, through misadventure or for any 
other reason, you should act immediately to put matters right, if that is possible. You 
should explain fully to the patient what has happened and the likely long-and-short term 
effects. When appropriate you should offer an apology. If the patient is an adult who 
lacks capacity, the explanation should be given to a person with responsibility for the 
patient, or the patient's partner, close relative or a friend who has been involved in the 
                                                 
6 New South Wales Medical Board, Code of Professional Conduct: Duties of a doctor registered with 
the New South Wales Medical Board (2005) <http://www.nswmb.org.au/index.pl?page=44> at 27 
March 2007. 
7 The GMC was established under the Medical Act of 1858 (UK). It has powers to protect, promote and 
maintain the health and safety of the public. The governing body, the Council, has 35 members: 19 
are doctors elected by doctors on the register; 14 are members of the public appointed by the Privy 
Council; and two are academics appointed by the universities and medical royal colleges.  
8 General Medical Council Good Medical Practice London 1998. See [16–21]; See especially [17]. 
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care of the patient, unless you have reason to believe the patient would have objected to 
the disclosure. In the case of children the situation should be explained honestly to 
those with parental responsibility and to the child, if the child has the maturity to 
understand the issues. 9 
 
Most Australian State and Territory Medical Boards have adopted, or are in the 
process of adopting provisions in essentially the same terms as the NSWMB Code. 
For example, the Medical Board of the Northern Territory has adopted a set of Good 
Medical Practice Guidelines,10 which are in essentially the same terms as the 
NSWMB provisions and in particular, patient disclosure is limited to cases of serious 
harm.11 To the same effect is the Medical Board of Western Australia Policy 
document, ‘The duties of a medical practitioner registered with the Medical Board of 
Western Australia’12, the Medical Council of Tasmania’s ‘Guide to Good Medical 
Practice’.13 The Medical Practioners Board of Victoria’s ‘Good Medical Practice’ is 
also in similar terms to the NSWMB Code.14 
 
It should be noted that the Queensland provisions15 contemplate a broader disclosure 
obligation, which, like the UK ‘Good Medical Practice Guidelines’, is not limited to 
cases of serious harm, but extends to all harm. The Queensland guidelines provide, 
inter alia:  
 
                                                 
9  That statement remains in identical terms in the current 2001 edition of Good Medical Practice: 
General Medical Council Good Medical Practice (3rd ed) London May (2001) [22]; 
<http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/index.asp> at 27 March 2007. 
10 Effective 14 May 2004 (to be reviewed 23 January 2007) 
 <http://www.nt.gov.au/health/org_supp/prof_boards/medical/Good%20Practice%20Medicine%20Gu
idelines.doc> at 27 March 2007. 
11 See: 2.5 (If Things Go Wrong and 2.9 (Your Duty To Protect All Patients). 
12 See 4.5 (If Things Go Wrong) and 4.9 (Your Duty to Protect all Patients) 
<http://www.wa.medicalboard.com.au/pdfs/DutiesOfADoctor.pdf> at 27 March 2007. 
13 See 2.5 (If Things Go Wrong) and 2.9 (Duty to protect all patients) 
<http://www.medicalcounciltas.com.au/pdfs/Guide%20to%20Good%20Medical%20Practice.pdf> at 
27 March 2007.  
14 Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria, ‘Good Medical Practice’ 
<http://medicalboardvic.org.au/pdf/Good%20Medical%20Practice.pdf> at 27 March 2007.  See 
especially, [2.5] (If things go wrong) which confines the patient disclosure obligation to cases of 
serious harm and [2.9] (Your duty to protect all patients).   
15 See 
<http://www.medicalboard.qld.gov.au/publications/Resource%20Pack/Good%20Medical%20Practic
e.pdf> at 27 March 2007.  
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2.5 (If things go wrong)  
2.5.1 If a patient under your care has suffered or may suffer harm, through 
misadventure or for any other reason, you should act immediately to put matters right if 
that is possible. You should explain fully to the patient what has happened and the 
likely short and long-term effects. This explanation should be provided to those who 
have legal responsibilities for a patient when that situation arises. When appropriate, 
you should offer an apology.  
 
By contrast, the Code of Ethics published by the Australian Medical Association 
(AMA)16 makes no express reference to an ethical obligation to disclose adverse 
events to patients or others such as peer review bodies. This is so even though the 
AMA Code refers to the 1996 Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics, which 
was subsequently updated in 2004 to provide that practitioners should ‘Take all 
reasonable steps to prevent harm to patients; should harm occur, disclose it to the 
patient’.17 The AMA Code does include, however, a requirement in its very first 
clause to ‘Consider first the well-being of your patient’,18 an express requirement to 
‘Maintain accurate contemporaneous clinical records’,19  and the exhortation to ‘Make 
sure that you do not exploit your patient for any reason’.20 Furthermore there is also a 
requirement to ‘Report suspected unethical or unprofessional conduct by a colleague 
to the appropriate peer review body’.21 It may be that clinical incompetence will be 
regarded as unprofessional conduct22 so that an obligation to report to a peer review 
body may arise. In New South Wales, s 36(1)(a) of the Medical Practice Act 1992 
(NSW) provides that for the purposes of the Act, unsatisfactory professional conduct 
of a registered medical practitioner includes ’any conduct that demonstrates that the 
knowledge, skill or judgment possessed, or care exercised, by the practitioner in the 
practice of medicine is significantly below the standard reasonably expected of a 
                                                 
16 References are to the version released on 3 May 2004 <http://www.ama.com.au/web.nsf/doc/WEEN-
6VL8CP> at 27 March 2007. 
17 See [14] <www.cma.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/2419/la_id/1.htm> at 27 March 2007. 
18 Cl 1.1a. 
19 Cl 1.1f. 
20 Cl 1.1h. 
21 Cl 2.1d. 
22 See, eg, Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria Re: Dr Ronald Leopold Graydon van Houten 
[2002] MPBV 19. 
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practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience.’ It may also be that 
failure to comply with the open disclosure standard, especially where patients have 
been deliberately misled as to the events which occurred during treatment, will 
amount to professional misconduct.23 
 
IV LEGAL DUTIES   
A Statutory Duties 
1 United States 
In the United States, the American Medical Association publishes a set of principles 
of medical ethics, which include the following statement:24 
 
It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physician should at all times deal honestly 
and openly with patients. Patients have a right to know their past and present medical 
status and to be free of any mistaken beliefs concerning their conditions. Situations 
occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical complications that 
may have resulted from the physician’s mistake or judgment. In these situations, the 
physician is ethically required to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure 
understanding of what has occurred. Only through full disclosure is a patient able to 
make informed decisions regarding future medical care. Ethical responsibility includes 
informing patients of changes in their diagnoses resulting from retrospective review of 
test results or any other information. This obligation holds even though the patient’s 
medical treatment or therapeutic options may not be altered by the new information. 
Concern regarding legal liability which might result following truthful disclosure 
should not affect the physician’s honesty with a patient.25  
 
Several states of the United States of America have enshrined this ethical principle in 
legislation. For example, the New Jersey Patient Safety Act (‘NJSA’)26 requires every 
health care facility to inform every patient affected by a ’serious preventable adverse 
                                                 
23 Skidmore v Dartford & Gravesham [2003] UKHL 27. 
24 See E-8.12: Patient Information. 
25 The AMA (USA) publishes its policies on the internet, see 
<www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-
8.12.HTM&&s_t=&st_p=&nth=1&prev_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-
7.05.HTM&nxt_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-8.01.HTM&> at 27 March 2007. 
26 See <http://www.lindabury.com/resources/Patient%20Safety%20Act.pdf> at 27 March 2007.  
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event or adverse event specifically related to an allergic reaction no later than the end 
of the episode of care, or if discovery occurs after the end of the episode of care, in a 
timely fashion (author’s emphasis).’ In cases where it is determined that disclosure 
‘would seriously and adversely affect the patient's health’, the notice can be provided 
to a family member, however, ‘if an adult patient is not informed of a serious 
preventable adverse event or adverse event specifically related to an allergic reaction, 
the facility shall assure that the medical record includes a statement that provides the 
reason for not informing the patient’.27  
 
Similarly, in Pennsylvania, s 308 of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of 
Error (Mcare) Act (2002), Act 13 of 2002, imposes a statutory duty on health care 
workers28 to report serious events or incidents29 and an obligation on medical 
facilities30 to notify the patient in writing of a serious event within 7 days.31  
 
2 Australia 
Although many Australian jurisdictions have now enacted legislation to give medical 
practitioners some protection from legal suit when apologising for or expressing  
                                                 
27 NJSA 26:2H-12.25(3)(d); NJSA 26:2H-12.23 et seq. 
28 ‘Health care worker’ is defined in s 302 to mean ‘An employee, independent contractor, licencee or 
other individual authorised to provide services in a medical facility’.  
29 Section 308(a). 
30 ‘Medical facility’ is defined in s 302 to mean ‘An ambulatory surgical facility, birth center or 
hospital’. 
31 Section 308(b). Similar provisions exist in Nevada (Revised Statutes title 40 s 439.835 (2003)) and 
Florida (Revised Statutes title 29 s 395.1051 (2003)): See the discussion in Carol Liebman and Chris 
Hyman, ‘A Mediation skills model to manage disclosure of errors and adverse events to patients’ 
(2004) 23(4) Health Affairs 22. New legislation is expected to take effect in Illinois from 1 January 
2008, which will that will require hospitals and surgery centres in the State to publicly admit if they 
commit any of 24 types of ‘never events’ -  ‘inexcusable hospital foul-ups that should never occur 
but happen all too often’. Such events include operating on the wrong limb, leaving a surgical sponge 
behind, using the wrong blood type or causing a patient death with a medication overdose. 
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regret regarding an adverse event or outcome,32 there is no corresponding express 
statutory duty33 to give an expression of regret, a factual explanation of what 
happened, information regarding the consequences of the event; or an outline of steps 
being taken to manage the event and prevent a recurrence, as envisaged by the 
ACSQHC.34  
 
While the purpose of such provisions may have been to facilitate and encourage the 
making of apologies without fear of legal exposure,35 there is no irreconcilable tension 
between an apology and a duty to disclose adverse events. The importance of both 
open disclosure and an apology, where appropriate, as a way of improving 
communication and trust between patients and health care providers — and ultimately 
avoiding unnecessary litigation — has been identified by Dr Albert Wu of the John 
Hopkins University School of Medicine in the following comment:  
 
In over 25 years of representing both physicians and patients, it became apparent 
that a large percentage of patient dissatisfaction was generated by physician attitude 
and denial, rather than the negligence itself. In fact, my experience has been that 
close to half of malpractice cases could have been avoided through disclosure or 
apology but instead were relegated to litigation. What the majority of patients really 
wanted was simply an honest explanation of what happened, and if appropriate, an 
                                                 
32 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 68-9;  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 68–72; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA), ss 5AF–5AH; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 7; Civil Law (Wrongs Act) 2002 
(ACT), ss 12–14; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 11–13. Compare 
with Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14I–J (not admission but still admissible); Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 75 (not admission only). For a discussion see Prue Vines, ‘Apologising to avoid liability: 
cynical civility or practical morality?’ (2005) 27(3) Sydney Law Review 483. The New Jersey Patient 
Safety Act provides an interesting contrast, in that the sections giving protection do not apply where 
the health professional has ‘displayed recklessness, gross negligence or willful misconduct, or in 
which there is evidence, based on other similar cases known to the facility, of a pattern of significant 
substandard performance that resulted in serious preventable adverse events’: NJSA 26: 2H-
12.25(3)(f). 
33 Liability may arise for nondisclosure on the basis that silence may amount to a misrepresentation 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or State Fair Trading Acts. 
34 See  
<http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/3D5F114646CEF93DC
A2571D5000BFEB7/$File/opendisclfact.pdf> at 27 March 2007. 
35 Villa has observed that the NSW Second Reading speech for the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
explained the rationale for the reforms as follows: Injured people often simply want an explanation 
and an apology for what happened to them … This is therefore an important change that is likely to 
see far fewer cases ending up in court: Dominic Villa, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (2004), 293–4. 
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apology. Unfortunately, when they were not only offered neither but were rejected 
as well, they felt doubly wronged and then sought legal counsel.36  
 
B Common Law Duties 
1 English Authority 
There has been some English judicial comment on a legal duty to disclose adverse 
events. In Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority,37 Sir John Donaldson, MR, 
considered that a duty of candid disclosure ought to be recognised as an aspect of the 
general tortious duty of care, and as an implied contractual term. Such an obligation is 
founded on notions of the protection of bodily integrity, individual autonomy and the 
right to self-determination. Sir John Donaldson said:  
 
I personally think that in professional negligence cases, and in particular in medical 
negligence cases, there is a duty of candour resting on the professional man. This is 
recognised by the legal professions in their ethical rules requiring their members to 
refer the client to other advisers, if it appears that the client has a valid claim for 
negligence.  
 
This also appears to be recognised by the Medical Defence Union, whose view is that 
‘the patient is entitled to a prompt, sympathetic and above all truthful account of what 
has occurred’ (Journal of the MDU (1986) vol 2, no 2, p 2). It was also the view 
(admittedly obiter) of myself and Mustill LJ, as expressed in our judgment in Lee v 
South West Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] 2 All ER 385 at 389–390 [1985] 
1 WLR 845 at 850.  
 
In this context I was disturbed to be told during the argument of the present appeals that 
the view was held in some quarters that whilst the duty of candid disclosure, to which 
we were referred, might give rise to a contractual implied term and so benefit private 
fee-paying patients, it did not translate into a legal or equitable right for the benefit of 
national health service patients. This I would entirely repudiate. In my judgment, still 
                                                 
36 Albert Wu, ‘Handling hospital errors: is disclosure the best defence?’ (1999) 131(12) Annals of 
Internal Medicine 970, cited in Corrs Chambers Westgarth, above n 3, pt 3.6 Open disclosure: will it 
increase or decrease litigation?, 24. 
37 (1987) 2 All ER 353. 
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admittedly and regretfully obiter, it is but one aspect of the general duty of care, arising 
out of the patient/medical practitioner or hospital authority relationship and gives rise to 
rights both in contract and in tort.38 
 
2 Australian Authority 
Naylor39 was considered by Justice Bryson in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
first instance judgment in Breen v Williams,40 which of course ultimately found its 
way to the High Court.41 By way of obiter, His Honour said: 
 
In Lee v South West Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 WLR 845 at 850, 
851 Donaldson MR and Mustill J made obiter observations supporting a duty of a 
hospital to report what had happened in an operation in which the patient had suffered 
catastrophically. Donaldson MR referred to these observations in Naylor v Preston 
Area Health Authority [1987] 1 WLR 958 at 967 and confirmed them. These 
observations were based on the consideration that there may be an implied contractual 
duty to inform the patient what treatment he in fact received. I would not doubt that 
there is, as communication with the patient, both before and after treatment, of the 
diagnosis, advice about what treatment is proposed, and of a report of what treatment 
has taken place are all integral and essential parts of treatment. They are essential 
where the patient is conscious and has the capacity to participate in them, because of 
the nature of the patient as a person with a right to give or withhold consent to an 
intervention in his body by another person. 
 
Informing a patient of what treatment has been given and what has taken place while 
doing so, whether or not there has been a catastrophe, is integrally and necessarily 
part of giving medical treatment to a person. One cannot stick a needle into a person 
and walk away wordless, as one would with a horse. I would respectfully say that 
Donaldson MR’s observations appear to me to be correct and plainly so, but that they 
                                                 
38 Ibid 360. Such a duty has also been recognised in Canada: see Stamos v Davies (1985) 21 DLR (4th) 
507 (Ont HC); Gerula v Flores (1995) 126 DLR 507. For a discussion of the US case law, see Joan 
Vogel and Richard Delgado, ‘To tell the truth: physicians’ duty to disclose medical mistakes’ (1980) 
29 UCLA Law Review 52; Theodore Le Blang and Jane King, ‘Tort liability for nondisclosure: the 
physician’s legal obligations to disclose patient illness and injury’ (1984–1985) 89 Dickinson Law 
Review, 26–30, 35–45 
39 Ibid 37. 
40 1994, New South Wales Supreme Court, unreported, Bryson J, 10 October 1994. 
41 (1996) 186 CLR 71. 
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relate to treatment and not access to medical records, or to the provision of 
information after everything which could be regarded as treatment has concluded.  
 
There may be practical implications under the common law for nondisclosure of 
adverse events for patients in some circumstances. Nondisclosure may mean that 
the patient loses the opportunity to obtain remedial treatment. For example, in 
Wighton v Arnot42 (Wighton) investigation and disclosure of the suspected adverse 
event would have made a difference to the patient’s long term prognosis, but it was 
too late for a successful repair of the severed nerve by the time the patient 
discovered what had happened.43  In that case it was held that a duty to disclose 
arose in circumstances where the knowledge was of relevance to the patient’s 
medical outcome and was a necessary part of reasonable after care. The duty was 
held to extend to an obligation to make investigations where there is a suspicion of 
an adverse outcome. Justice Studdert said:  ‘What the exercise of due care required 
of the defendant was that he take reasonable steps to determine whether it was the 
accessory nerve which had been severed, and that he alert the plaintiff as to what 
had occurred’.44 
 
As to suspicion, His Honour stated: ‘Plainly, it was the defendant’s duty to seek to 
determine whether his suspicion at the time of surgery was well founded’.45 
 
Justice Studdert then went on to address the patient’s right where there was such a 
suspicion of adverse events: 
 
                                                 
42 [2005] NSWSC 637. 
43 ‘No further surgery has been undergone by the plaintiff, and I am satisfied that the opportunity for a 
successful repair was lost before the plaintiff discovered that her spinal accessory nerve had been 
severed in November 1999’, [33] (Studdert J). 
44 Above n 42, [38]: Such a duty has been recognised in the US; see, for example, Mink v University of 
Chicago 460 F Supp 713 (ND Ill 1978): ‘When the University hospital became aware, or should 
have become aware, of facts which would induce a reasonable physician under the same 
circumstances to warn patients of the risks involved in treatment, a duty to notify arose. The fact the 
knowledge of the risk was obtained after the patient was treated does not alter the obligation. If the 
defendant fails to notify the patient when the risk becomes known, he has breached this duty’ 
(Studdert J). 
45 Above n 42, [39] (Studdert J). 
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Further, it seems to me that at the time of discharge, even if by that time the defendant 
did not know it was the accessory nerve he had severed, the plaintiff had a right to 
know, and the defendant had a duty to inform her, that he had severed a nerve which he 
suspected was the accessory nerve.46 
 
In Wighton47 there was no finding that the defendant doctor had been negligent in the 
performance of the operation, or in severing the nerve. Justice Studdert summarised 
the plaintiff’s case as being that the defendant severed the right spinal accessory nerve 
at the third of the surgical procedures undertaken, and that his treatment of the 
plaintiff thereafter was negligent in that:  
 
• he failed to inform the plaintiff of his suspicion that he had severed that 
nerve;48 
• he failed by appropriate examination to confirm that he had severed the 
nerve; and 
• he failed to refer the plaintiff to an appropriate specialist for timely remedial 
surgery.  
 
It seems, therefore, that the doctor would not have been found liable in negligence had 
he disclosed the adverse event to the patient.49 
 
Although it has been suggested that therapeutic privilege may be a defence to 
nondisclosure of adverse outcomes,50 this was not accepted in Wighton51. Justice 
Studdert said:  
 
                                                 
46 Ibid [64] (Studdert J). 
47 [2005] NSWSC 637. 
48 Above n 42 at [71-72]: It is possible that disclosure to the patient’s general practitioner may have 
been sufficient (Studdert J). 
49 Above n 42, [36]: ‘The plaintiff does not contend that the defendant was negligent in severing the 
nerve during the course of the operation. Nor is it contended that the defendant should have repaired 
the nerve during the surgery on 10 November’ (Studdert J). See also [37-38] and the expert evidence 
at [65-67].  
50 See Le Blang and King, above n 38, 45. 
51  [2005] NSWSC 637. 
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Dr Arnot said that he did not tell the plaintiff in hospital about the severance of the 
nerve because of her emotional state and because it was only a possibility that he had 
severed this nerve, and that possibility he considered to be ‘probably wrong’ because of 
his examination following surgery (T 476). Acceptance of the doctor’s explanation for 
not alerting the plaintiff to what occurred depends upon acceptance that the shrug test 
was performed. Since I am not persuaded that it was, I do not find the defendant’s 
explanation for not telling the plaintiff about the division of the nerve to be an 
acceptable explanation.52 
 
In Wighton53 as the expert evidence established that the usual practice would have 
been to disclose and investigate the suspected adverse event, and provide an 
opportunity for remedial surgery if necessary, the claim in negligence was made out.54 
It would also seem that the recent ethical guidelines relating to disclosure of adverse 
events to patients would be evidence of widely accepted competent professional 
practice in Australia for the purposes of s 5O Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 
Alternatively, given that the AMA has not adopted an express ethical obligation to 
disclose adverse events to patients, if evidence was led that nondisclosure was widely 
accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice, 
given the NSWMB and corresponding ethical guidelines in other jurisdictions, it 
could be argued under sub-s (3) that there were differing peer professional opinions 
widely accepted in Australia which required such disclosure. In any event, there may 
be scope for the court to intervene under sub-s (2) in cases where peer professional 
opinion which considered that nondisclosure was led as evidence of the appropriate 
standard and declare such peer professional opinion to be ‘irrational’. However, given 
s 5P, it may be that s 5O does not apply to cases where a breach of duty to disclose 
error is alleged. Section 5P provides that ‘This Division does not apply to liability 
arising in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or 
other information in respect of the risk of death of or injury to a person associated 
with the provision by a professional of a professional service’.55 If this is the case the 
                                                 
52 Above n 42, [69] (Studdert J).  
53  [2005] NSWSC 637. 
54 See the expert evidence of Dr McKenzie at [65–67]. 
55 As to ss 5O, 5P see generally Villa, above n 35, 88-101.   
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law as stated in Rogers v Whitaker56 will apply to cases relating to failure to disclose 
medical error.57  
 
 V CONCLUSIONS 
 
Honesty and trust are central to the health care professional/patient and health care 
institution/patient relationship, and health care professionals and institutions want to 
do ‘the right thing’ by their patients: ‘Honest, effective and open communication is 
the foundation of the relationship between clinicians and patients. Telling the truth is 
always the right thing to do. Concealing the truth is wrong’.58  
 
Although ‘concern regarding legal liability which might result following truthful 
disclosure should not affect the physician’s honesty with a patient’,59 it would seem 
that there is no evidence that open disclosure will necessarily lead to increased 
litigation. In relation to the question as to whether open disclosure increases or 
decreases litigation, the ACSQHC has commented:  
 
Adhering to the principles of the Open Disclosure Standard may result in an increase in 
legal claims. We know, however, that many health care errors do not become the 
subject of litigation and, unless the harm suffered by the patient is serious, legal action 
is unlikely to be taken. It is possible that open disclosure may assist patients who have 
suffered an adverse event to make a claim by providing them with the necessary 
information and understanding on which to base a claim. However, evidence suggests 
that following the principles of open disclosure may actually reduce a patient’s desire to 
pursue legal action.60 
 
                                                 
56 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
57 Ibid 409 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
58 William Barron and Mark G Kuczewski, ‘Unanticipated Harm to Patients: Deciding When to 
Disclose Outcomes’ (2003) 29(10) Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety 551, 552   
59 Above n 24; See also AMA, above n 25. 
60 See 
<http://www.safetyandquality.org/internet/safety/publishing.nsf/Content/6A2AB719D72945A4CA2
571C5001E5610/$File/opendisclfact.pdf> at 27 March 2007; See generally Corrs Chambers 
Westgarth, above n 3; See also Le Blang and King, above n 38, 45. 
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Practical guidelines to assist those who wish to implement open disclosure were 
developed by the ACSQHC in 2003. There are sound ethical reasons for promoting 
open disclosure as a means to enhance the trust between patient and health care 
professional, which has been recognised in recent ethical pronouncements of the 
various state and territory medical boards, though not yet by the Australian Medical 
Association.  
 
In Australia, despite statutory protection for apologies, there is no statutory duty to 
disclose adverse events to patients, unlike in the United States. However, judicial 
statements in England and Australia suggest some support for a general duty to 
promptly disclose, certainly in a clear case, the fact of an adverse event and the 
possibility of any negligent aspect to the treatment, as an integral and necessary part 
of treatment and clear recognition where the patient suffers harm through the breach. 
In any event, it would seem that compliance or otherwise with the new ethical 
guidelines as to disclosure will now be a relevant consideration as to whether a 
practitioner has acted in accordance with widely accepted competent professional 
practice. 
